Explaining Changing Patterns of European Integration Attitudes in the 21st Century

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Introduction

In the past few years, Euroscepticism—negative attitudes among citizens toward European integration and/or the European Union—has substantially increased and reached new, unprecedented heights across Europe. How are we to explain this second wave of Euroscepticism after the turn of the millennium, which has amplified a first wave in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s? Past research has told us a good deal about the various sources of anti- and pro-European attitudes. Most prominently, utilitarian considerations and, more recently yet with increasing vigor, cultural and identity-related motives as well as party cues have been brought forward by scholars and proven to be critical factors shaping public opinion on Europe (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2005; 2009).

However, we should not take for granted that these well-established explanations will continue to work exactly as they have so far. The issue of European integration combines quite a few distinct features (Hoeglinger 2013). First, it is a complex, highly multifaceted issue that covers economic, political, and cultural aspects and, at the same time, the relative importance of these various aspects is shifting over time, which makes it an ever-moving target for politicians and citizens alike. Second, it is—unlike more tangible issues, such as crime or infrastructure—highly abstract for ordinary citizens. And third, it is still a comparatively new issue, having entered the public political debate only recently (although quite massively in some instances). What are the implications of these features on the study of Euroscepticism? First, with attitudes toward this new issue still being minimally entrenched and Europe being a highly dynamic issue, established explanatory patterns are likely to change over time. And second, the abstractness and complexity of the European integration issue should make individual citizens highly susceptible to cues by those segments of the political elite they support or trust in.

Against this backdrop, the present paper has the following contributions to make. First, it provides a *reassessment of the established body of knowledge on how to explain Euroscepticism* when analyzing attitudes in Switzerland during the 2000s. It then extends further by exploring how the various factors shaping European integration attitudes play out *among the different (partisan) constituencies* as well as how the relative impact of these factors *develops over time*. Both questions have received little attention in the literature so far (for recent noteworthy exceptions, see Hakhverdian et al. 2013; Lubbers

and Scheepers 2010). With regard to Switzerland in the 2000s, studying Euroscepticism as a dynamic and group-specific phenomenon may also provide answers to the question of how to explain the fact that a significant share of previously pro-European Swiss citizens have changed their minds on Europe during this period and, related to this, which segments of the population have first and foremost become newly (or more strongly) Eurosceptic.

These questions are also of more general scholarly interest beyond the field of Euroscepticism. In fact, European integration attitudes provide an excellent opportunity for researchers interested in understanding the formation of political attitudes of complex and dynamic political issues more generally.[1] Of course, understanding public opinion on Europe is also of very practical relevance, as it is acting as both a major constraint and a resource for politicians when dealing with integration policies and EU politics, but also given its ramifications on national politics and voting (see, e.g., de Vries 2010; particularly for populist-right mobilization and voting: Kriesi 2007; Werts, Scheepers, and Lubbers 2013).

The paper is structured as follows: In the next section, the three main theoretical strands of the Euroscepticism literature—economic utility, cultural motives, and political cues—are briefly discussed and the (sparse) literature on explaining trends in Euroscepticism is reviewed to formulate our hypotheses. After a brief methodological section, the empirical part starts with a descriptive overview and is then followed by an analysis proceeding in two steps: a static inquiry reassessing the effect of these well-established factors on Euroscepticism and exploring differences among partisan groups and then a dynamic analysis to uncover the changing impact of some of these crucial factors over time.

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[1] It has been a matter of scholarly debate whether the process of European integration represents a case *sui generis* requiring its own theoretical tools and concepts or whether it can be dealt with as a case like others (e.g., Verdun 2003). However, at least if one looks at the political implications of European integration, such as its impact on political contestation, on public opinion and the like, this question of the idiosyncratic, unique nature of the European integration process is of less relevance.

Explaining attitudes toward a complex and dynamic political issue

Three bundles of factors shaping Eurosceptic attitudes

What are the reasons that some citizens are more opposed to European integration than others? This is the crucial question the literature on Euroscepticism has been dealing with. Marks and Hooghe (2005; 2009, see also Hakhverdian et al. 2013; Sciarini and Tresch 2009) identify three major bundles of factors that affect public opinion on European integration, namely utilitarian cost-benefit calculations, identity-related cultural considerations, and political cues. As I will also discuss, however, these three bundles of factors are sometimes difficult to distinguish. Partisan cues may also substantively convey economic or cultural motives; and the effect of some socio-demographic variables such as education can be explained via both utilitarian and identity-related mechanisms.

Economic utility and identity-related cultural values

Utilitarian considerations, primarily economic ones, have been put forward prominently in the 1990s as a key factor to explain negative attitudes toward Europe (e.g., Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998). The costs and benefits of European integration (with a main focus on the common market and its efficiency gains), it has been argued, are not equally distributed across European citizens. Some member countries are to benefit more than others, and some social groups gain more than others. This point is well in line with the more general argument that European integration is part and parcel of a newly emerging globalization cleavage that pits the winners against the losers of this process of boundary lowering and restructuring (Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi et al. 2008), although these scholars have placed stronger emphasis on the mobilization of cultural and political "losers," to which I turn in the following section. Yet there are economic winners and losers as well. For example, some segments of the population may be fearful that more intense competition as a result of establishing a common market could lead to cuts in jobs and to welfare state retrenchment in their home country, while others appreciate the new economic and career opportunities that are opening up to them.

Economic utility has been conceptualized in different ways. A crucial distinction can be made between egocentric and sociotropic utility. *Egocentric utility*—how much individuals are able to benefit personally from European integration—is determined by an individual's

relative competitiveness, his or her human and financial capital. This can be assessed with information on an individual's position in the social hierarchy (social class) as measured with data on occupational skills, education level, and income (Gabel 1998). Basically, if an individual scores low on these indicators, he or she is likely to become more strongly exposed to (labor market) competition and to face a higher risk of unemployment. At the same time, he or she will be less able to benefit from the new job and income opportunities newly provided by market integration. Therefore, we would expect individuals with fewer resources and who are more vulnerable to increased competition to be more Eurosceptic.

However, utilitarianism is a more complex motive that also manifests itself in other forms than such narrowly understood rational selfishness (see, e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2005; McLaren 2006). Citizens may take into consideration not only the effect on their own personal situations but also that on the nation as a whole. Such *sociotropic utilitarianism* calculates the costs and benefits of European integration and EU membership at the country level and can be measured with indicators such as a country's EU budget balance (how much it pays in and how much it receives), its intra-EU trade balance (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993), or general economic indicators such as BIP growth, unemployment, and inflation. However, because the present paper focuses on a single country and is not comparative, we will not be able to test this dimension of economic utility.[2]

[2] A further distinction can be made between *objective* versus *subjective* costs and benefits or risks of European integration. In order to tap subjectively perceived utility, one would need to ask individuals to assess, for example, the consequences of European integration on their personal economic situation or, alternatively, on the country they live in. For Switzerland in 1999, Christin and Trechsel (2002) argue that the most significant determinant to explain opinion on EU membership is an individual's subjective evaluation of the consequences of membership on the national economy. Unfortunately, such questions have not been asked in the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) data, which is used for the analysis in this paper.

The second group of factors consists of identity-related and cultural considerations. Although scholars have started to seriously consider them only more recently, the findings of these studies clearly show that their effect on Euroscepticism is significant, and some have even suggested that their impact on attitudes is larger than economic utility (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2005; McLaren 2006). Citizens with *exclusive nationalist identities*, *anti-immigration views*, and *culturally conservative attitudes* more generally perceive European integration as a threat to their own ethnic community as well as to their country's sovereignty. Right-wing parties in many Western European countries have successfully mobilized on these cultural fears, thereby significantly increasing their vote share.

Moreover, a major underlying determinant of cultural value orientation is *education*, an indicator that is typically also used to tap an individual's human capital and labor marketability to explain Euroscepticism based on utilitarian motives, as outlined in the section above. Stubager (2008) convincingly shows, however, that education also has a direct effect on cultural values that stems from an individual's socialization within the educational system. Therefore, the influence of education on Euroscepticism is supposed to work not only via economic utility, but also via cultural values (see also Hakhverdian et al. 2013). As a result, the hypothesized effect of education cannot be attributed to either economic interest or cultural values.

Based on this brief discussion of these first two bundles of factors shaping Euroscepticism, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

H1.1: The higher an individual's costs of increasing market integration (economic vulnerability), the higher the probability he/she is Eurosceptic.

H1.2: Culturally conservative orientations, in particular anti-immigration sentiments, are strong predictors of Eurosceptic attitudes.

H1.3: The higher an individual's educational level, the lower the probability he/she is Eurosceptic.

Political cues and political involvement

Third, *political cues* are essential in shaping public opinion on European integration. For most citizens, it is an unrealistic assumption that they have the time as well as the knowledge to figure out by themselves what cultural values and, even more so, which economic interests are at stake for them in a particular policy area. Instead, citizens rely on cues that provide them with information on how to link a particular issue with its ideological or partisan implications (Zaller 1992). This holds particularly true for the issue of European integration. European integration is—unlike, for example, immigration—a newly emerging, complex, and highly abstract political issue of which ordinary citizens are struggling to make sense. Hence, we should expect them to rely heavily on the cues provided by the political elite as to how to situate European integration in the broader political (ideological) context (see also Sanders and Toka 2013, 19). Probably the most elementary cue is a party's position on a specific issue – an individual supporting a particular party is likely to follow that party's position on European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 425; Ray 2003, 990). Although, on principle, cueing may work in both directions, from elites to voters as well as from voters to elites (see Sanders and Toka 2013; Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries 2007), most studies look at party cues only, i.e., the effect that party positions on European integration exert on citizens' attitudes (de Vries and Edwards 2009; Gabel and Scheve 2007a; Gabel and Scheve 2007b; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Ray 2003), a limitation that can be reasonably justified given the peculiar nature of the European integration issue, as argued above.

However, the effect of political cues is expected to be unevenly distributed across the constituency. In particular, the *mediating role of political involvement* on opinion formation has become a well-established research topic following the seminal study of Zaller (1992). Already in the early studies on European integration attitudes, these variables of political involvement have been occasionally included as stand-alone variables to test the so-called *cognitive mobilization approach* (Inglehart 1970; Janssen 1991), which postulates a uniform positive influence. The basic idea is that individuals with higher cognitive skills are better informed and therefore less likely to feel threatened by the unknown nature of European integration, an argument that has received mixed empirical support (see, e.g., Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Gabel 1998; McLaren 2006). Yet the most

fascinating is anyway not this alleged uniform effect of political involvement but its mediating role. Previous findings suggest that citizens who are politically highly involved are more susceptible to party cues and, as a result, their European integration preferences are more closely aligned with their preferred party's position (see Sciarini and Tresch 2009 for this argument in the context of support for international openness; Hobolt 2005 for European referendum vote choice). We will test this theoretical proposition in the empirical part.

An additional source of elite cues, besides the parties, are *national governments*. Measures of government support, satisfaction, and trust are routinely included when studying European integration attitudes and vote choice (e.g., Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Hobolt 2005). The reasoning behind this is that perceptions of the national government are supposed to spill over to the EU level, not least because decisions taken by national government representatives at EU summits are still the most publicly visible manifestations of EU power. Similarly, the recent findings by Harteveld et al. (2013) suggest that trust in the EU is primarily an extension of trust in national institutions and largely unrelated to the EU itself. Moreover, in line with the still influential scholarly view of the "second-order" nature of European politics (Reif and Schmitt 1980), it is argued that voters perceive European issues as of little relevance and therefore use European Parliament elections and referendum votes on European integration as means to punish their governments. All these arguments suggest that attitudes toward the national government should have an impact on European integration attitudes. In the case of non-member state Switzerland, however, such an extrapolation of trust to the EU or any automatic linkage of the national government with the EU is less warranted. By contrast, it makes more sense to conceptualize the effect of perceptions of the national government on European integration attitudes as a cueing effect, similarly as for the parties, particularly because the position of the Swiss government has evolved over time. Hence, an individual who feels positively about the national government is more likely to adopt a country's official stance toward European integration. In most but not all instances, this results in an individual feeling positive about the government and being more supportive of Europe as governments typically strongly endorse integration.

Moreover, political elites not only provide positions, but they also justify these positions by supporting them with persuasive arguments. In the case of the multifaceted issue of European integration, an intense *framing contest* is raging. Opponents of European integration argue both in economic and cultural terms; they depict European integration as a threat both to labor and social security as well as to national identity and national sovereignty, although the latter usually predominates (Helbling, Hoeglinger, and Wueest 2010; Hoeglinger 2013, chapter 7). Hence, the aforementioned utilitarian interests and the cultural considerations are themselves part of the political contestation surrounding Europe and crucial elements of the mobilization efforts of political parties. As a result, citizens' assessments and weighting of the cost or benefits and the risks of European integration should be influenced by this ongoing partisan conflict over Europe and the resulting framing. This expectation is supported by recent findings by Edwards and de Vries (2009), who found that the presence of populist right parties increases Euroscepticism among individuals with exclusive national identities, whereas the presence of radical left parties mobilizes Euroscepticism among individuals who feel economically insecure. For the Swiss context, I expect that the exceptional strength of the right-populist SVP and, by contrast, the lack of a relevant radical left party should be reflected in a public Euroscepticism that is, overall, rooted strongly in culturally conservative values and less so in economic (leftist) concerns (cf. Skinner 2013).

However, the persuasiveness of an argument is conditional upon the *credibility of its source* (Druckman 2001). Generally, citizens are more likely to believe in an argument that is put forward by their own party, although they are not immune to competing frames. As Chong and Druckman (2007, 113–4) nicely summarize their research, "either side, through the creative use of frames, can create alternative home positions for voters. It is generally not the case that a campaign can anchor all its supporters unilaterally with a reassuring value-consistent frame. Each side has the potential to draw voters away from its opponents using frames for its own position that may also appeal to the other side's voters [although] [s]ome voters (extreme ideologues and partisans especially) may not be movable from one side to the other through framing because they resist discrepant information or rely heavily on source cues." Hence, similarly as for positional cues, one might expect that arguments

against Europe do not "bite" uniformly across the constituency but that the effect is conditional upon the partisan group, which is likely to find its own respective arguments to be the most convincing. In fact, the recent study by Maier, Adam, and Maier (2012) shows that, under certain circumstances, this is exactly what happens in an experimental setup.

To summarize this section on political cues and political involvement, we can formulate a second set of hypotheses:

H2.1: Partisanship is a strong predictor of an individual's attitude toward European integration.

H2.2: The more politically involved an individual is, the more supportive he/she is of European integration.

H2.3: The effect of partisanship on European integration attitudes increases, the more an individual is politically involved (interaction effect).

H2.4: Similarly as for partisanship, positive views of the government are a strong predictor of an individual's (pro-)European integration attitudes.

H2.5: The effect of cultural and economic motives is conditional upon partisanship, with cultural motives having a stronger effect for right populist supporters, and, by contrast, economic motives having a stronger effect for partisans on the left.

Changing patterns of Euroscepticism over time

A noteworthy feature of the issue of European integration is its dynamic because it is a moving target (Hooghe and Marks 2008). In the 1990s, the European Union underwent a process of unprecedented deepening and widening. With the establishment of the common market and the monetary union, the focus of the integration process has changed from market making to market shaping. The reform agenda laid out in the Treaty of Maastricht as well as those following in Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon pushed European integration far beyond what used to be a simple economic community, extending its policy competences into areas such as social policy, the environment, and judicial and home affairs as well as security and foreign policy. Along with that, the supranational institutions and the political powers of the EU were gradually strengthened. At the same time, EU

membership more than doubled from 12 states in the early 1990s to 27 in 2007, the latest newcomers being the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Such profound shifts in the main thrust and the pace of European integration as well as the scope and character of the European Union should be reflected in the attitudes of the public toward this issue. In one of the few studies explicitly dealing with the evolution of European integration attitudes over time, Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) ascribe the well-known European-wide drop in EU support after Maastricht in 1991 to newly arising "distributive concerns" fueled by the monetary union and its budgetary implications, particularly on national welfare states. Studying EU support at the macro level, they find that the explanatory power of factors critical to explain pre-Maastricht support, such as inflation, GDP, and intra-EU exports, virtually evaporated for the era of the "post-Maastricht blues" and all lost statistical significance (2007, 137–8). In return, the authors speculate about newly emerging relevant factors, such as social security concerns and identity-related cultural fears. What these findings more generally suggest is that *not only does the general level of European support change over time, but, theoretically more interesting, so does the impact of the underlying factors that shape these attitudes.*

Unfortunately, scholars rarely look explicitly at the dynamics of European integration attitudes and the changing explanatory patterns of opposition and support over time. Another noteworthy exception in this regard is the recent study by Lubbers and Scheepers (2010). Relying on the Eurobarometer trend file, they find that the impact of education on Euroscepticism is decreasing in some member countries over time while increasing in others. In addition, there is a small non-significant effect of left-right placement, which means that over time, right-wing supporters have become more Eurosceptic. Overall, however, their effort in not only describing but explaining trends in Euroscepticism over time turns out to be rather sobering. They hardly find any factors that significantly change their impact over time, and therefore the authors come to the conclusion that the revealed trends in Euroscepticism are rather difficult to explain. In a further comparative study that focuses on education—a single yet powerful factor shaping Euroscepticism—Hakhverdian et al. (2013) find evidence for *a widening educational gap* after Maastricht, with the lower- and middle-educated strata becoming more Eurosceptic, while the level of support from the highly educated remains continuously high. The reason for this gap is, according to

these authors, simply the ongoing widening and deepening of the EU, which has made the economic, cultural, and political factors through which the impact of education is working more and more relevant.

The effect of another standard socio-demographic variable on Euroscepticism, age, has been explored in depth recently by Downs and Wilson (2013). In particular, they try to disentangle cohort from life-cycle effects, which both are potentially at work if the effect of age is included in an analysis without further considerations. They find that while individuals in general are becoming more Eurosceptic the older they get (because they are less and less able to benefit from the opportunities the EU and European integration are providing), the effect of cohorts is more complex: Europeans who lived through the Great Depression and the Second World War are more supportive than later generations, but then again the generations who have come of age since the mid-1980s show increasing levels of support. While we will not be able to disentangle the effect of cohorts and life cycle with our data, we can at least check whether the effect of age is in line with previous studies and whether it remains constant over time. The findings of Downs and Wilson, in line with previous studies, suggest that age has a positive overall effect on Euroscepticism.

Moreover, the ongoing party contestation over Europe should also have an impact on European integration attitudes. Above, I considered party (positional) cues as static, yet in reality, they are evolving. During the period under study, in Switzerland only the left parties have maintained their clear pro-European stance, while the parties of the center-right have become increasingly ambivalent or even adopted Eurosceptic positions. Yet already moderate levels of intra-party dissent are sufficient to cause a substantial portion of their supporters to adopt anti-EU opinions, as Scheve (2007b) shows. Hence, we would expect citizens who support center-right parties to become increasingly Eurosceptic over time, as compared to left party supporters. The right-wing populist SVP has maintained its fundamental anti-European position, and therefore we should expect constantly high levels of Euroscepticism among its supporters. Moreover, the Swiss government has gradually changed its attitude toward Europe and—with the consolidation of the bilateral approach—has lost its initial enthusiasm. This became manifest most notably in the Federal Council's decision in 2006 to shift Swiss EU accession from a "strategic goal" to a mere "option."

Hence, similar as for center-right party cues, I expect that the effect of positive attitudes toward the national government on European integration views is decreasing over time.

This final theoretical section on explanatory trends in Euroscepticism allows us to specify our last two hypotheses that deal with how the impact of particular factors is expected to change over time:

H3.1: The negative impact of education on Euroscepticism is increasing over time.

H3.2: The diminishing (negative) effect on Euroscepticism of both center-right party support and of positive attitudes toward the national government is decreasing over time.

Data and Measurement

This study relies on data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP)[3] using the 11 panel waves of the years 1999–2009.[4] For reasons of comparability, only the first sample of households is used that has been surveyed since the start of the SHP in 1999; individuals from the refresher sample added in 2004 are excluded. Only respondents that are part of the voter population have been considered (over the age of 18, Swiss citizens). Due to panel attrition and non-response, we are left with 36'615 observations by 7'379 individuals who participated in at least one interview during the 11 years.

[3] The SHP is based at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences FORS. The project is financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation. See swisspanel.ch for further information.

[4] Since 2009, political attitudes have not been included on the survey on a yearly basis any longer.

The huge advantage of the SHP data is that it allows tracking changes in individual attitudes over several years and its high quality. The drawback is that the survey is designed for a rather broad field of research questions and not specifically targeted to study political attitudes or, even more narrowly, Euroscepticism. However, the socioeconomic household panel in Switzerland has an unusually high number of questions relevant for political science. Still, measurements of political attitudes are limited in comparison to the surveys commonly used to study Euroscepticism (e.g., EVS, ESS, Eurobarometer).

Operationalization/Variables

The *dependent variable* in our analysis is the question of whether the respondent is in favor of or against Switzerland joining the EU, with the three possible answer categories "in favor of joining," "neither," and "in favor of staying outside."

For *social class*, the analysis relies on an 8-fold simplified version of the Oesch (2006a; 2006b) class scheme, which is able to capture the more complex social stratification of modern (service) societies, particularly among the salaried middle class. The other socio-demographic variables *age*, *gender*, *linguistic region*,[5] and *education* are all straightforward.

Concerning *cultural considerations*, Euroscepticism has been linked to anti-immigration attitudes, (exclusive) national identity, or culturally conservative values in general. The question used in this study as an indicator for cultural considerations taps primarily anti-immigration sentiments by asking whether the respondent agrees that foreigners should have the same opportunities as the Swiss. I coded those respondents who answered that

[5] Due to the low number of individuals from the Italian-speaking region, only a dummy for individuals from the French-speaking region of Switzerland has been included in the analysis. However, the level of Euroscepticism of the Italian-speaking region is not substantively different from the German-speaking region.

Swiss should have better opportunities with a "1," and all other respondents were coded with a "0."

As an indicator of *party cues*, I used vote intention. The SHP alternatively also asks for party membership, yet because party membership is notoriously low in Switzerland, I did not use this question. I regrouped the parties for which respondents would vote into three categories: Left party supporters (Green and Social Democrats), Center-right party supporters (Christian Democrats, Liberals and Radicals), and Populist Right supporters (Swiss People's Party, Swiss Democrats, and other, more marginal parties from the radical right[6]). Individuals answering that they do not vote for any party (but for a candidate regardless of partisanship) were classified as independents (non-party voters). The number of supporters of the Radical Left was too small to have them included in the analysis. Supporters of other, even more marginal parties were also excluded.

The variable on *government trust* asks respondents to indicate their level of trust in the Federal Council and the Swiss national government, on a scale ranging from 0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence). *Political involvement* is routinely measured with indicators such as factual questions about political knowledge, the frequency of political discussions, or political interest. Only the latter has been asked in the SHP survey, with a scale ranging from 0 (not at all interested) to 10 (very interested).

[6] These marginal parties from the radical right are the EDU, the *Freiheitspartei*, and the *Lega dei Ticinesi*.

Results: Euroscepticism in Switzerland 1999–2009

Before turning to an analysis of the underlying causes of Euroscepticism, let us first have a quick look at the general level and the development of European integration attitudes in Switzerland over time throughout the first decade of the new century. As *Figure 1* shows, the share of respondents who prefer to stay outside the EU increases from 33 percent in 1999 to 57 percent in 2009, a substantial difference of 24 percentage points that results from a steady, almost linear rise of negative attitudes toward the EU in the course of the 11 years that are covered by our data. This trend is by no means an expression of any Swiss exceptionalism, but well in line with similar results within the EU. Lubbers and Scheepers (2010) find a trend toward stronger Euroscepticism in the late 1990s through the early 2000s for most member countries.

Which crucial events happened during this period in Switzerland? Direct democratic votes in this policy area were held quite frequently and gave parties many opportunities to communicate their stances on the EU and European integration to their constituencies. Following the crucial referendum vote against joining the European Economic Area in 1992, which was rather unexpectedly won single-handedly by the right-populist Swiss People's Party (SVP), the Swiss Federal Council embarked on a strategy of "integration without membership" (Lavenex 2009) by launching negotiations on a number of sectorial treaties with the EU. A first round of negotiation resulted in the *Bilateral Agreements I*, which were approved by popular vote in May 2000 (67.2 percent yes votes). Less than a year later, the popular initiative *Yes to Europe*, which called for the immediate opening of accession negotiations with the EU in March 2001, was heavily rejected by 76.8 percent of the electorate. Even the Swiss Federal Council, although then principally in favor of EU membership, advised a no vote criticizing the initiative as overhasty. A second round of bilateral treaties, the *Bilateral Agreements II*, was signed in 2004 and a referendum was launched against its most controversial element, the *Schengen/Dublin Association Agreement*. However, the Swiss electorate approved the agreement in June 2005 (54.6 percent yes votes), and in September of the same year, it also agreed on the extension of the free movement of persons to the new CEE member states (56.0 percent yes votes). The bilateral approach pursued by the Swiss government continued to find popular support, first in a vote on the Swiss contribution to the EU cohesion funds in November 2006 (53.4

percent yes votes) and later in February 2009 when 59.6 percent of the electorate approved of the extension of the free movement of persons to the latest new member states, Bulgaria and Romania.

Still, in spite of the ongoing vivid political debate surrounding these critical events, individual preferences have remained rather stable over time, as the transitions reported in *Table 1* suggest. Eighty-six percent or more of those individuals who report in one survey wave that they are either in favor or against EU accession stick to their preference in the following wave the next year. Only among those few respondents who do have ambivalent attitudes toward the EU (5.8 percent of all responses) do we observe frequent transitions—80 percent of these individuals change their attitudes to either pro- or anti-European from one survey wave to the next. This suggests that the relatively rare ambivalent attitudes reflect a rather unstable and transitory stage of an individual's European integration preferences.

Economic utility and cultural considerations put to test

How well do the factors most prominently discussed in the literature on Euroscepticism, as elaborated in the theory section, explain European integration attitudes in Switzerland in the 2000s? *Table 2* presents the results of several models regressing Euroscepticism on socio-demographic, cultural, and political factors.[7] Because the size of the coefficients in these ordinal logit models cannot be interpreted straightforwardly, average predicted probabilities for the selected variables of interest and their interactions are presented in the

[7] The results presented are from pooled ordinal logit regressions with cluster-robust standard errors accounting for the non-independence of observations within individuals. Dummies for the panel waves (year) were included but are not reported. I also ran corresponding multilevel ordered logit models with random-effects for the individuals, yet the results did not differ substantively (see *Table A.1.* and *Table A.2.* in the appendix).

following when discussing the substantive and theoretical implications of the results.[8] Moreover, of the three possible outcomes of the dependent variable (supporting accession, ambivalent, opposition to accession) the predicted probability of an individual *opposing accession* is always reported. *Model 1* starts with the most fundamental socio-demographic variables, including class and education. The results for class are well in line with the economic utility approach, with groups varying in their degree of Euroscepticism depending on their levels of resources and their vulnerability to competition. As *Figure 2* shows, the social classes differ systematically in their predicted probability, with socio-cultural professionals being the least Eurosceptic and small business owners, production workers, and service workers being considerably more Eurosceptic than the intermediary classes (although the difference of the probability of the service workers from the intermediary classes is not statistically significant at the 95% level). The difference is quite substantive in some cases—for example, production workers on average have a 21-percentage-point higher probability than socio-cultural professionals of opposing EU accession.

The effect of education is similar, but weaker—the percentage point change in probability of support from the lowest to highest educational group is 11 percent. However, as argued above, education is a factor that works both via economic utility (human capital) and cultural values (socialization within the education system), and without closer examination, one should be careful not to assign its impact on Euroscepticism to either of these two approaches. With our data, such a closer examination is not possible, yet previous findings suggest that a larger part of the educational effect (and to some extent also the effect of class) is due to higher levels of political tolerance of the better educated.

[8] Average predicted probabilities are obtained by calculating the predicted probability for each case in the sample, setting the variable(s) of interest at the specified value while leaving all other variables at their real value.

Hence, education is more closely related to cultural motives than economic considerations (McLaren 2006, 102–9; see also Stubager 2008).

Age is, as hypothesized, statistically significant, but the direction of the effect is contrary to our expectations. Moreover, the effect is conditional upon gender. As *Figure 3* shows, the younger male voters are, the more likely they are to be Eurosceptic (which results in a significant difference in Euroscepticism between young and middle-aged male vs. female voters). This is a finding that challenges most other studies that find an opposite effect of age on European integration attitudes. We will come back later to discuss this finding when we also look at whether this effect remains constant over time. Finally, the control variable, linguistic region, which has proven to be relevant for the Swiss case in previous studies, is statistically significant and substantial—German-speaking Swiss are 21 percentage points more likely than French-speaking Swiss to be Eurosceptic.

Model 2 tests the hypothesized impact of cultural factors on European attitudes by adding a question tapping anti-immigration sentiments. The effect of this item is large, and it leads to a respectable increase in the fit of *Model 2* as compared to *Model 1*. On average, an individual who opposes equal opportunities for foreigners in Switzerland has a 25-percentage-point higher probability of being Eurosceptic. Of course, it is not clear whether this effect is due to anti-immigration attitudes per se or rather due to a generally culturally conservative value orientation (of which both anti-immigration and Euroscepticism are a part of), yet it clearly corroborates the postulated crucial impact of culture on European integration. Interestingly, the impact of education remains significant, but it is slightly weaker than in *Model 1* (now, a 7.6% percentage point change from lowest to highest education level, as compared to 10% before), suggesting that part of the effect of education works via cultural orientations, as argued above.

Partisanship and political involvement

The regression models so far have considered general socio-structural variables, economic utility and cultural motives. However, as argued above, for most citizens it is implausible to assume that they would be willing or able to make sense of the European integration issue by themselves as it is far from obvious how to relate the newly emerging and multi-faceted issue to the interests of particular social groups and basic political concerns. Therefore, they rather rely on cues by the political elite, preferably by the party they support (or, in addition, the government if they trust it). In *Model 3*, these political variables are therefore included as well. Again, the overall fit of the model improves significantly. Following Zaller (1992) and also suggested by previous findings on support for international openness in Switzerland in general (Sciarini and Tresch 2009), I hypothesized that there is an effect of party (positional) cues, which, however, is conditional upon political involvement. The predicted probabilities in *Figure 4* lend strong support to this expectation. Supporters of the radical/populist right are generally considerably more likely to oppose European integration than the center-right party supporters and those voters who do not support any party. Left party supporters, moreover, are the least likely to oppose European integration. What is more, however, is that the impact of political cues varies across levels of political involvement: The probability of being Eurosceptic increases among populist right supporters the more politically involved they are, whereas the probability decreases among left party supporters with rising levels of political involvement. Concretely, the difference in the probability of opposing European integration among the least politically interested populist right and left party supporters is non-significant and only moderate with 15 percentage points, whereas the difference between these two partisan groups rises to as much as 67 percentage points among the most politically interested stratum. By contrast, among center-right party supporters and independents, the probability remains constant over the various levels of political interest. In sum, this suggests that individuals who support a particular party are inclined to follow the cues they receive if these cues are clear and unambiguous. While the populist right and the left parties seem to be able to effectively cue their (politically involved) constituency, there is no discernible cueing effect among center-right party

supporters—not surprising given the highly ambivalent European integration stances of politicians from both the Christian democrats and the liberals in Switzerland.

Noteworthy, the effect of political interest *per se* is not significant. Hence, there is no uniform pro-European effect of political involvement, as postulated by the cognitive mobilization approach. This challenges the validity of the findings by the many studies that supported this argument yet which simply included measures of political involvement in their analyses without taking into account the possibility that the size and, most importantly, the direction of this effect might be conditional upon partisanship (e.g., Tillman 2013).

Moreover, as *Figure 5* shows, the more an individual trusts the government, the less likely he or she is to oppose European integration. Hence, governmental cues and an individual's susceptibility to them (as measured by the level of government trust) seem to matter in the context of European integration attitudes. Of course, at a theoretical level, we cannot rule out the alternative explanation that trust is a more general trait of an individual or that it is simply extended from the national to the EU level (see Harteveld, van der Meer, and de Vries 2013), although, as I argued above, in the case of a non-member state like Switzerland, such an extrapolation is less plausible.

Finally, I also ran an additional model (not reported here) with interactions between partisanship and the factors related to economic utility (class) and cultural motives (anti-immigration sentiment). The underlying theoretical argument, as outlined above, is that the parties emphasize different motives to support or oppose European integration in public debates depending on their ideological stances, and that an individual is more likely to embrace and seriously consider those arguments that are put forward by the supported party. However, contrary to expectations, very few of these interactions were statistically significant and they all turned out to be not substantive in terms of differences in predicted probabilities across partisan groups. Hence, though the positional cueing of their own constituency worked for parties with either a clear pro-European or a clear Eurosceptic

stance, substantive (economic or cultural) cues do not have a differential impact on the various partisan groups. Left partisans are not more likely to react more sensitively to economic threats, and neither do right populist supporters more strongly connect anti-immigration sentiments to Eurosceptic attitudes than other party supporters.[9]

Changing patterns of European integration attitudes over time

In this section, we move from a static to a dynamic analysis of Euroscepticism, dealing with time not simply as a nuisance but as an explanatory factor in its own right. As *Figure 1* showed, Euroscepticism has steadily and considerably increased over time. Yet does this merely reflect an increase across the board, or did the specific explanatory patterns we have looked at in the previous section change over the course of the years as well? The following analyses will allow us to probe this question in greater depth.

Model 4 in *Table 3* is basically similar to *Model 3*, which included the full set of our variables of interest and their relevant interactions, with the sole difference that instead of simply controlling for time (with dummies for the individual years/survey waves), a linear time trend is now included. Indeed, as indicated by the highly significant coefficient, this positive linear trend nicely captures the development over time, and consequently, the fit of this more parsimonious *Model 4* is only marginally worse than that of *Model 3* (as reflected in the minimally lower log likelihood).[10] Concretely, Euroscepticism increases

[9] However, though the *impact* of anti-immigration sentiments on Euroscepticism is relatively uniform across partisan groups, the *share of individuals* who exhibit these anti-immigration sentiments varies considerably, as could be expected: 54.0 percent of right-populist supporters disagree that foreigners should have the same opportunities as Swiss, as compared to only 13.4 percent of left party supporters, 30.3 percent of the center-right partisans and 29.0 percent of the independents.

[10] Moreover, a model with an additional quadratic effect of t (not reported) was also tested, but this interaction yielded no statistical significance, and the model fit did not improve.

more or less linearly by 2 percentage points each year. However, what about the time trends of the previously discussed effects that proved to have a (static) impact on Euroscepticism? *Model 5* in *Table 3* includes several interactions to test for this.[11]

Based on the findings of Hakhverdian et al. (2013), we expected that the impact of education on Euroscepticism is increasing over time. However, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed in our case. Education shows no significant time trend (neither the separate categories nor jointly). Moreover, as Hakhverdian et al. argue that the effect of education might be mediated to a large extent by economic, cultural, and political factors, I run a model that included only education, time, age, and gender to capture these indirect effects of education as well (not reported). As expected, the impact of education in this model is higher; however, there is still no significant time trend. We can only speculate about the reasons for this deviating finding for Switzerland, which was not in the sample of countries studied by Hakhverdian et al.[12] One reason might be that the widening educational gap is primarily a result of the increasing mobilization of the European integration issue in domestic politics, mainly by right populist parties. With Switzerland as a trailblazer of this development, this widening might have started in the early 1990s and already reached its limits by the end of this decade. If this were true, this development would not show up in our more recent data from the 2000s.

Next, we turn to the expected diminishing impact of political cues due to the increasingly ambivalent stances of center-right parties and the government regarding Europe. Indeed, as *Figure 6* indicates, trust in government in the latest year under study, 2011, has lost a good portion of its impact on Euroscepticism as compared with 1999. Concretely, the difference in the average predicted probability of being Eurosceptic between individuals at the lowest

[11] Note that the fit of Model 5 as compared to Model 4 increases only marginally, and the BIC value even suggests that Model 4 is to be preferred over Model 5 in terms of balancing model fit vs. parsimony.

[12] Hakhverdian et al. (2013, 12) found such a widening gap in 11 of the 12 member countries under study, the only exception being Luxembourg.

vs. individuals at the highest level of trust was cut in half from 26 to 13 percentage points in the course of these 11 years.

The picture for party cues, conditional upon political interest, is more complex, as *Figure 7* shows. Recall that in the static model, a substantial effect of political interest on Euroscepticism that went in opposite directions, respectively, for the populist right and the left party supporters could be observed, while there was no effect whatsoever for the center-right party supporters and the independents. However, on the part of the left party supporters, this pattern is not constant over time. In fact, the impact of political interest among left party supporters is at the beginning of our period under study only marginal yet increases significantly over the years and becomes highly relevant, which is reflected in the much steeper slope of the line for 2009 as compared with the 1999 line. In other words, only the highly politically involved left partisans have remained firm pro-Europeanists over the course of the years and truly loyal to their party's official stance (predicted probability of 16 and 23 percentages for 1999 and 2009, respectively). By contrast, the less politically involved left party supporters have considerably increased their previously very low probability of being Eurosceptic and, as a result, have to some extent caught up with the other partisan groups (the predicted probability of the least interested has risen from 22 to 55 percent). In 2009, the least interested left supporters do not differ any more significantly in their probability from the center-right party supporters and the independents. Overall, while there is a weakening impact of governmental trust, as hypothesized, the center-right party cues are permanently without any significant impact across the various levels of political involvement. Interestingly, it is only among left party supporters where we find a change in the cueing effects over time, as outlined above.

Finally, *Figure 8* explores whether the (gendered) negative effect of age, an intriguing yet unexpected finding in the previous section, is stable over time. As the figure shows, the impact of age on Euroscepticism is becoming significant only over the years as it increases considerably. For example, the average predicted probabilities of being Eurosceptic for a 30-year-old male in 1999 was merely 3 percentage points higher than for a 60-year-old male, though this difference did grow to 12 percentage points in 2009 (The growth rate of the age gap for females is similar, only starting at a considerably lower level). Hence, the unexpected finding that the young are more Eurosceptic is a rather recent development. If

it is to continue, it might have far-reaching consequences for the future of Swiss–EU relations.

Conclusion

With many member states hit hard by the Eurozone crisis that grew out of the global financial crisis and with EU institutions struggling to cope with the adverse political, economic, and social repercussions, the last few years were not at all conducive to establish faith in the EU and to demonstrate to non-member countries the benefits of joining the club. However, as the findings in this study showed, Swiss Euroscepticism was significantly on the rise already before the early 2000s. Moreover, as I argued, European integration is a highly complex and dynamic political issue. And what the EU and European integration are actually about is a matter of intense and ongoing political contestation among politicians. These features of the political issue itself and the conflict surrounding it should be reflected in heterogeneous and shifting public attitudes, which this paper set out to explore in more detail. It took a closer look at the sources of this more recent Euroscepticism with a special focus on the *differential impact* of several well-established factors among the various (partisan) groups and the *changing explanatory trends* over time. For this purpose, the paper relied on the Swiss Household Panel's yearly waves from 1999 to 2009, a unique longitudinal dataset covering more than 10 years, and which has—to my best knowledge—not yet been used to study Eurosceptic attitudes.

Overall, the findings yielded mixed support for the propositions made. Indeed, partisanship and attitudes toward the national government significantly influenced whether an individual had positive or negative attitudes toward Europe. Moreover, political involvement proved to be a critical mediating factor, which corroborates earlier findings on attitudes toward political openness in general (Sciarini and Tresch 2009): Whereas left party supporters turn increasingly pro-European the more politically involved they are, the effect on populist right party supporters is exactly the opposite, increasing their likelihood of being anti-European. Consequently, future research on Euroscepticism cannot ignore

partisanship any longer (which is still frequently done), and furthermore, it should refrain from simply including variables that measure political involvement without checking for the potentially huge interaction effects of those variables with partisanship.

On the other hand, the study found no evidence that the impact of the substantive economic and cultural motives put forward to support or oppose European integration is conditional upon the particular party an individual feels close to, as hypothesized. Anti-immigration sentiment is a strong predictor of Eurosceptic attitudes, yet this motive did not play out differently across the various partisan groups. The same holds for social class, which is indicative of the economic utility an individual is able to derive from European integration. Further research is needed to clarify whether this finding is robust or whether more sophisticated measures of economic and cultural considerations yield different results.

In regards to explanatory trends over time, the study found significantly changing effect sizes (in terms of predicted probabilities) for government trust, political interest among left party supporters, and age. Hence, the increase in Euroscepticism in the first decade of the 21st century was particularly pronounced among those citizens who trust the government, among left party supporters with low political interest and among the young. The former two findings suggest, as hypothesized, that the political cues of traditional pro-European supporters have lost some of their power—in part, presumably, because these politicians' own positions regarding European integration have become more ambivalent. The growing negative effect of age on Euroscepticism is a rather unexpected finding, because most previous studies found that the young are generally more likely to be pro-European. Future studies will have to show whether this trend persists and, more specifically, whether it is due to cohort replacement or changing life-cycle effects.

These moderate changes in explanatory trends, while highly interesting, need to be put into perspective as the study also found a significant linear increase in Euroscepticism across the board, which cannot be explained by individual determinants. Hence, what Hakhverdian et al. (2013) had to conclude, that trends in Euroscepticism are difficult to explain, seems also to be true for the Swiss case. Chances are that this will remain a difficult endeavor, as data that offer a rich amount of potentially relevant variables and at the same time cover a long period of time have yet to be assembled. Still, the insights

gained here on the dynamic nature of European integration attitudes and the changing impact of some critical factors suggest to scholars of Euroscepticism in general that time needs to be taken more seriously in future research. Of course, longitudinal studies are hard to conduct, but much would already be gained if scholars of Euroscepticism who analyze data from one single point of time discussed at some length for which specific time frame they expected their findings to hold, instead of (implicitly) generalizing their results across time.

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Tables & figures

Figure 1: EU-attitudes in Switzerland over time (weighted sample)



Table 1: Transition probabilities of EU attitudes 1999-2009

	t+1			
t	Joining EU	Neither /ambivalent	Staying outside EU	*Total*
Joining EU	85.6%	4.1%	10.3%	*100%*
Neither/ambivalent	36.0%	19.6%	44.3%	*100%*
Staying outside EU	9.2%	3.7%	87.1%	*100%*

Table 2: Predicting Euroscepticism in Switzerland 1999-2009 (ordinal logit regressions of Euroscepticism on socio-demographic, cultural and political variables, with cluster corrected standard errors)

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
	Coeff.		*Coeff.*		*Coeff.*	
	(S.E.)		*(S.E.)*		*(S.E.)*	
Class (ref. socio-cultural professionals)						
Self-employed/large employers	0.524	***	0.411	***	0.202	*
	(0.094)		(0.095)		(0.094)	
Small business owners	1.040	***	0.895	***	0.562	***
	(0.091)		(0.091)		(0.091)	
Managers and administrators	0.639	***	0.533	***	0.291	***
	(0.083)		(0.082)		(0.082)	
Office clerks	0.638	***	0.488	***	0.282	**
	(0.093)		(0.092)		(0.091)	
Technical professionals	0.594	***	0.512	***	0.335	**
	(0.104)		(0.102)		(0.104)	
Production workers	0.963	***	0.776	***	0.495	***
	(0.092)		(0.091)		(0.092)	
Service workers	0.807	***	0.658	***	0.405	***
	(0.089)		(0.089)		(0.088)	
Education (ref. lower than upper secondary level)						
Upper secondary level	-0.126		-0.093		-0.071	
	(0.072)		(0.071)		(0.071)	
Tertiary level	-0.479	***	-0.359	***	-0.285	***
	(0.085)		(0.084)		(0.085)	
Age	-0.009	***	-0.011	***	-0.013	***
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Female	-0.513	**	-0.570	***	-0.483	**
	(0.156)		(0.157)		(0.158)	
Female*age	0.008	**	0.009	**	0.008	*
	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
French linguistic region	-0.961	***	-0.964	***	-0.950	***
	(0.057)		(0.056)		(0.058)	
Anti-immigration sentiment („better opportunities for Swiss“)			1.129	***	0.790	***
			(0.045)		(0.046)	

(continued)

(Table 2 continued)

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
	Coeff.		*Coeff.*		*Coeff.*	
	(S.E.)		*(S.E.)*		*(S.E.)*	
Party preferences (ref. centre-right)						
Radical/Populist Right					0.425	*
					(0.199)	
Left					-0.274	
					(0.153)	
No party-voter					0.151	
					(0.127)	
Interest in politics					0.021	
					(0.018)	
*Party preferences*interest in politics*						
Radical/Populist Right*interest in politics					0.158	***
					(0.032)	
Left*interest in politics					-0.127	***
					(0.023)	
No party-voter*interest in politics					0.000	
					(0.020)	
Trust in government					-0.116	***
					(0.010)	
Year						
(dummies, omitted from table)	x		x		x	
Cut 1	0.226		0.416	**	-0.532	**
	(0.143)		(0.143)		(0.188)	
Cut 2	0.483	***	0.687	***	-0.224	
	(0.143)		(0.144)		(0.188)	
N	36‘615		36‘615		36‘615	
N clusters (individuals)	7‘379		7‘379		7‘379	
Log pseudolikelihood	-28‘941		-27‘939		-25‘636	
BIC	58‘145		56‘151		51‘630	
AIC	57‘933		55‘930		51‘340	

Notes: Log pseudolikelihood of the empty model is -30’737. Sampling weights applied.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure 2: The impact of social class on Euroscepticism (average predicted probabilites, with 95% confidence intervals)



Figure 3: The gendered impact of age on Euroscepticism (average predicted probabilities, with 95% confidence intervals)



Figure 4: The differential impact of political interest on partisan groups' Euroscepticism (average predicted probabilities, with 95% confidence intervals)



Figure 5: The impact of government trust on Euroscepcticism (average predicted probabilities, with 95% confidence intervals)



Table 3: Predicting Euroscepticism in Switzerland 1999-2009 *with time trends* (ordinal logit regressions with cluster corrected standard errors)

	Model 4		**Model 5**	
	Coeff.		*Coeff.*	
	(S.E.)		*(S.E.)*	
Class (ref. socio-cultural professionals)				
Self-employed/large employers	0.184	*	0.185	*
	(0.093)		(0.094)	
Small business owners	0.568	***	0.571	***
	(0.091)		(0.091)	
Managers and administrators	0.291	***	0.293	***
	(0.081)		(0.081)	
Office clerks	0.288	**	0.292	**
	(0.091)		(0.091)	
Technical professionals	0.338	**	0.342	**
	(0.104)		(0.104)	
Production workers	0.500	***	0.504	***
	(0.092)		(0.092)	
Service workers	0.409	***	0.415	***
	(0.088)		(0.088)	
Education (ref. Lower than upper secondary)				
Upper secondary level	-0.074		-0.125	
	(0.071)		(0.080)	
Tertiary level	-0.285	***	-0.300	**
	(0.085)		(0.098)	
Age	-0.013	***	-0.005	
	(0.002)		(0.003)	
Female	-0.484	**	-0.507	**
	(0.158)		(0.159)	
Female*age	0.008	*	0.008	**
	(0.003)		(0.003)	
French linguistic region	-0.946	***	-0.953	***
	(0.058)		(0.058)	
Anti-immigration (better opportunities for Swiss)	0.779	***	0.779	***
	(0.046)		(0.046)	
Party preferences (ref. centre-right)				
Radical/Populist Right	0.405	*	0.573	*
	(0.200)		(0.265)	
Left	-0.275		-0.526	*
	(0.153)		(0.221)	
No party-voter	0.150		0.228	
	(0.127)		(0.178)	
Interest in politics	0.020		0.025	
	(0.018)		(0.024)	
*Party preferences*interest in politics*				
Radical/Populist Right*interest in politics	0.160	***	0.140	***
	(0.032)		(0.042)	
Left*interest in politics	-0.127	***	-0.063	
	(0.023)		(0.033)	
No party-voter*interest in politics	0.001		0.006	
	(0.020)		(0.028)	

(continued)

(Table 3 continued)

	Model 4		**Model 5**	
	Coeff.		*Coeff.*	
	(S.E.)		*(S.E.)*	
Trust in government	-0.113	***	-0.154	***
	(0.010)		(0.014)	
Time trends				
t (linear)	0.108	***	0.158	***
	(0.005)		(0.035)	
*t*education (ref. lower than upper secondary)*				
t*upper secondary level			0.009	
			(0.015)	
t*tertiary level			0.001	
			(0.016)	
t*age			-0.002	***
			(0.000)	
t*trust in government			0.008	**
			(0.002)	
*t*party preferences (ref. centre-right)*				
t*Radical/Populist Right			-0.028	
			(0.054)	
t*left			0.043	
			(0.038)	
t*no party-voter			-0.013	
			(0.032)	
t*interest in politics			-0.001	
			(0.004)	
*t*party preferences*interest in politics*				
t*radical/Populist Right*interest in politics			0.003	
			(0.008)	
t*left*interest in politics			-0.011	*
			(0.006)	
t*no party-voter*interest in politics			-0.001	
			(0.005)	
Cut 1	-0.579	**	-0.331	
	(0.187)		(0.233)	
Cut 2	-0.272		-0.023	
	(0.187)		(0.233)	
N	36‘615		36‘615	
N clusters (individuals)	7‘379		7‘379	
Log pseudolikelihood	-25‘705		-25‘658	
BIC	51‘672		51‘694	
AIC	51‘460		51‘387	

Notes: Sampling weights applied.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure 6: The decreasing impact of government trust on Euroscepticism over time (average predicted probabilities, with 95% confidence intervals)



Figure 7: The impact of partisanship conditional on political interest over time (average predicted probabilities, with 95% confidence intervals)



Figure 8: The increasing impact of age on Euroscepticism over time (average predicted probabilities, with 95% confidence intervals).



Appendix - Additional Tables and Figures

Table A.1: Multi-level ordered logit models with random-effects: socio-demographic, cultural and political variables (corresponding to ordered logit models in Table 2)

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
	Coeff.		*Coeff.*		*Coeff.*	
	(S.E.)		*(S.E.)*		*(S.E.)*	
Class (ref. socio-cultural professionals)						
Self-employed/large employers	0.709	***	0.672	***	0.521	***
	(0.120)		(0.119)		(0.116)	
Small business owners	0.965	***	0.904	***	0.743	***
	(0.117)		(0.116)		(0.112)	
Managers and administrators	0.815	***	0.782	***	0.611	***
	(0.113)		(0.111)		(0.108)	
Office clerks	0.838	***	0.782	***	0.607	***
	(0.125)		(0.123)		(0.119)	
Technical professionals	0.655	***	0.626	***	0.558	***
	(0.139)		(0.137)		(0.133)	
Production workers	1.195	***	1.124	***	0.909	***
	(0.126)		(0.124)		(0.120)	
Service workers	0.961	***	0.917	***	0.753	***
	(0.122)		(0.121)		(0.117)	
Education (ref. lower than upper secondary level)						
Upper secondary level	-0.610	***	-0.547	***	-0.419	***
	(0.116)		(0.114)		(0.106)	
Tertiary level	-1.301	***	-1.186	***	-0.923	***
	(0.134)		(0.131)		(0.123)	
Age	-0.019	***	-0.019	***	-0.019	***
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Female	-1.409	***	-1.324	***	-1.131	***
	(0.276)		(0.269)		(0.251)	
Female*age	0.020	***	0.018	***	0.016	***
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)	
French linguistic region	-2.610	***	-2.476	***	-2.121	***
	(0.108)		(0.105)		(0.096)	
Anti-immigration sentiment (better opportunities for Swiss)			0.866	***	0.786	***
			(0.055)		(0.054)	

(continued)

(Table A.1 continued)

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
	Coeff.		*Coeff.*		*Coeff.*	
	(S.E.)		*(S.E.)*		*(S.E.)*	
Party preferences (ref. centre-right)						
Radical/Populist Right					0.516	*
					(0.235)	
Left					-0.305	
					(0.185)	
No party-voter					0.225	
					(0.156)	
Interest in politics					0.012	
					(0.021)	
*Party preferences*interest in politics*						
Radical/Populist Right*interest in politics					0.166	***
					(0.037)	
Left*interest in politics					-0.128	***
					(0.028)	
No party-voter*interest in politics					-0.019	
					(0.024)	
Trust in government					-0.138	***
					(0.012)	
Year						
(dummies, omitted from table)	x		x		x	
Cut 1	-0.460		-0.129		-0.869	**
	(0.243)		(0.238)		(0.266)	
Cut 2	0.235		0.564	*	-0.183	
	(0.243)		(0.238)		(0.266)	
Random intercept variance	17.695		15.796		11.209	
	(0.763)		(0.664)		(0.444)	
N	36‘615		36‘615		36‘615	
N individuals	7‘379		7‘379		7‘379	
Log likelihood	-20‘522		-20‘405		-19‘990	
BIC	41‘317		41‘094		40‘348	
AIC	41‘095		40‘865		40‘050	

Notes: No sampling weights applied (unlike in the the ordinal logit regression models).
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.2: Multi-level ordered logit models with random-effects, *with time trends* (corresponding to ordered logit models in Table 3)

	Model 4		**Model 5**	
	Coeff.		*Coeff.*	
	(S.E.)		*(S.E.)*	
Class (ref. socio-cultural professionals)				
Self-employed/large employers	0.475	***	0.467	***
	(0.115)		(0.115)	
Small business owners	0.782	***	0.791	***
	(0.111)		(0.111)	
Managers and administrators	0.610	***	0.605	***
	(0.107)		(0.107)	
Office clerks	0.623	***	0.628	***
	(0.118)		(0.118)	
Technical professionals	0.559	***	0.573	***
	(0.132)		(0.132)	
Production workers	0.920	***	0.931	***
	(0.119)		(0.119)	
Service workers	0.766	***	0.779	***
	(0.116)		(0.116)	
Education (ref. Lower than upper secondary)				
Upper secondary level	-0.414	***	-0.537	***
	(0.105)		(0.130)	
Tertiary level	-0.909	***	-1.071	***
	(0.122)		(0.155)	
Age	-0.019	***	-0.008	
	(0.004)		(0.004)	
Female	-1.112	***	-1.176	***
	(0.248)		(0.250)	
Female*age	0.016	***	0.017	***
	(0.005)		(0.005)	
French linguistic region	-2.091	***	-2.105	***
	(0.095)		(0.095)	
Anti-immigration (better opportunities for Swiss)	0.744	***	0.744	***
	(0.053)		(0.053)	
Party preferences (ref. centre-right)				
Radical/Populist Right	0.476	*	0.562	
	(0.232)		(0.381)	
Left	-0.312		-0.437	
	(0.184)		(0.305)	
No party-voter	0.218		0.261	
	(0.155)		(0.254)	
Interest in politics	0.011		-0.004	
	(0.021)		(0.033)	
*Party preferences*interest in politics*				
Radical/Populist Right*interest in politics	0.169	***	0.184	**
	(0.036)		(0.060)	
Left*interest in politics	-0.126	***	-0.077	
	(0.027)		(0.045)	
No party-voter*interest in politics	-0.015		0.013	
	(0.023)		(0.039)	

(continued)

(Table A.2 continued)

	Model 4		**Model 5**	
	Coeff.		*Coeff.*	
	(S.E.)		*(S.E.)*	
Trust in government	-0.123	***	-0.179	***
	(0.012)		(0.020)	
Time trends				
t (linear)	0.233	***	0.292	***
	(0.007)		(0.045)	
*t*education (ref. lower than upper secondary)*				
t*upper secondary level			0.017	
			(0.018)	
t*tertiary level			0.013	
			(0.020)	
t*age			-0.003	***
			(0.000)	
t*trust in government			0.011	***
			(0.003)	
*t*party preferences (ref. centre-right)*				
t*Radical/Populist Right			-0.011	
			(0.063)	
t*left			0.026	
			(0.048)	
t*no party-voter			-0.008	
			(0.042)	
t*interest in politics			0.003	
			(0.005)	
*t*party preferences*interest in politics*				
t*radical/Populist Right*interest in politics			-0.004	
			(0.010)	
t*left*interest in politics			-0.009	
			(0.007)	
t*no party-voter*interest in politics			-0.006	
			(0.006)	
Cut 1	-0.929	***	-0.765	*
	(0.261)		(0.338)	
Cut 2	-0.252		-0.086	
	(0.261)		(0.338)	
Random intercept variance	10.880	***	10.908	***
	(0.429)		(0.431)	
N	36‘615		36‘615	
N individuals	7‘379		7‘379	
Log likelihood	-20‘119		-20‘088	
BIC	40‘511		40‘564	
AIC	40‘290		40‘249	

No sampling weights applied (unlike in the the ordinal logit regression models).
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001